Research note · 17 November 2026 · European public finance
Italy and Spain after the RRF: reforms, growth and debt
What remains after the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility—and why a declining debt ratio is not a reform guarantee.
The short reading · evidence reviewed 17 November 2026
Executive summary
Italy needs lasting fiscal results, not merely completed reform milestones. Its 2029 debt target of 136.6% of GDP assumes a primary surplus of 2.4%. Many tax, court and spending-review commitments already exist; recurring net savings, verified tax yields and stronger pension/ageing-cost restraint remain central tests. Growth, interest and other debt movements mean no reform package guarantees the target.[1][2][3][4]
Spain’s projected debt decline relies heavily on nominal GDP growth. That includes higher output prices, not just greater real productivity. Its July government debt objective of 95.3% in 2029 and AIReF’s November constant-policy forecast of 96.2% use different assumptions and dates; neither is an observed outcome or evidence that the RRF caused the decline.[7][8]
Both countries face the same EU framework, with different spending paths. Net expenditure—not an exact primary surplus or a falling debt ratio alone—is the operational constraint. Their seven-year adjustment extensions depend on reform and investment commitments; growth does not waive those obligations.[2][6][9][10]
The fiscal question
Italy does not lack a post-RRF reform programme. What it does not yet have, on the evidence reviewed, is a demonstrated, fully costed conversion of those commitments into the lasting primary surpluses behind its 136.6% debt-to-GDP target for 2029. Pension and ageing-cost restraint is the clearest additional reform gap. In taxation, spending control, courts and public administration, the issue is more often incomplete delivery or an unproven recurring fiscal return—not an absent commitment. No reform package can guarantee an exact debt ratio because growth, interest costs and other debt movements also matter.1 2 3 4
Manus AI — 17 November 2026, afternoon CET. Debt ratios mean gross general-government debt divided by nominal GDP. Italy’s October government policy projections and Spain’s November independent forecasts are identified separately; they are not a matched-vintage forecasting contest.
The dated fiscal figures, at a glance
These bars visualise the figures already discussed in this note. They do not estimate an RRF effect or update the forecasts. The three 2029 readings use different policy assumptions and publication dates.
Italy · government policy target
15 October 2026 · Source 1
136.6%
Spain · government objective
7 July 2026 · Source 8
95.3%
Spain · AIReF constant-policy forecast
4 November 2026 · Source 7
96.2%
All debt bars share the same zero-based 0–160% scale. None is an observed 2029 outcome. Italy and Spain are separate borrowers; these levels do not measure an RRF return.
Show Italy’s planned primary-surplus path, 2027–2029
This separate chart uses a 0–3% scale. A primary balance excludes interest; it is not a cyclically adjusted structural balance. The debt bars above must not be compared with these bar lengths.
Charts added 18 November 2026. Evidence cutoff and original analysis: 17 November 2026. Exact values and labels remain readable without JavaScript; the expansion uses a native browser disclosure.
Download the dated fiscal readings
CSV scope: the 6 selected numeric fiscal readings in the charts—three 2029 debt ratios and Italy’s 2027–2029 headline primary-surplus path. This is not the full report, raw RRF spending or a complete annual debt series. No forecasts have been updated.
Copies the same CSV header and six fiscal readings, including source dates and limitations—not a page link. Clipboard copying requires JavaScript and browser permission.
Manual copy of the same CSV
Evidence cutoff: 17 November 2026. Dated government policy targets/scenarios: Italy, 15 October 2026; Spain, 7 July 2026. AIReF constant-policy forecast: 4 November 2026. These are non-matched-vintage readings with different assumptions, not observed outcomes or evidence of RRF causation. A primary surplus excludes interest and is not a structural balance. Each row includes its source publication date, original URL, reference number, units and limitations. UTF-8 CSV; the native download works without JavaScript and makes no remote request.
What is missing or insufficient in Italy’s framework?
A stronger commitment to containing pension and ageing costs
Neither the final RRF reform subset nor the Council-endorsed commitments supporting Italy’s longer fiscal adjustment period specifies a pension-system fiscal reform. Digitalising the pension administration is not the same as changing pension expenditure. This does not mean Italy has no pension rules: the gap is an additional, durable response to the spending pressures identified by the OECD.2 3
The OECD recommends maintaining the pension-age link to life expectancy, avoiding new early-retirement schemes and exploring legally feasible reductions in first-pillar pension costs over the medium term. It also advocates shifting the composition of spending towards education and innovation. These are recommendations, not adopted savings that can be entered into the 2029 budget.3
This distinction matters politically and economically. Pension restraint could improve the primary balance, but indiscriminate cuts to health, education or investment could weaken growth and undermine the debt objective. The task is to control recurring age-related commitments while protecting productive capacity, not simply to reduce every spending category.3 4
Independently assessed recurring savings, not just review procedures
Italy already commits to annual spending evaluations through 2029, stronger MEF inspection powers and greater financial responsibility within administrations. The final RRF spending-review milestone certifies completion of the 2025 review and earlier savings targets. It does not establish an additional recurring saving for 2027–2029.2 5
The October Draft Budgetary Plan separately estimates ministerial spending-review measures at 0.05% of GDP in 2027 and 0.08% in each of 2028 and 2029. Those estimates should not be counted again as RRF savings. They also do not, by themselves, explain the much larger planned improvement in the primary balance.1
The unresolved requirement is a transparent year-by-year account of permanent savings and revenue measures, their implementation costs, and the offsets for new commitments. The IMF explicitly recommends comprehensive spending reviews and fully offsetting new spending with savings elsewhere. The reviewed reform milestones do not substitute for that budget arithmetic. Independent assessment and later outturn verification would make the promised savings more credible; they would still not guarantee them.4
Tax-base reform that produces verified net revenue
Tax reform is not absent. Italy’s Council-endorsed plan includes a 15% reduction in tax-expenditure revenue losses against the €49 billion baseline in the 2019 report, due by end-2028. It also specifies increases in prevention and enforcement collections by 2027 and 2029, while excluding specified settlement-type receipts. Cadastral commitments cover unregistered properties and updates for buildings that received publicly supported renovation or energy-efficiency works.2
However, those cadastral commitments are not a comprehensive revaluation of every property at current market prices. Nor are compliance targets, tax-expenditure reductions and cadastral updates automatically additive net revenues. Italy also promises a permanent reduction in the labour tax wedge, which needs financing.2
The missing assurance is the net, lasting budget yield after tax cuts, implementation costs and behavioural responses. The OECD favours a more growth-friendly tax mix, including less reliance on labour and more on property, alongside better VAT compliance and removal of unjustified tax expenditures. The IMF likewise recommends broadening the tax base. These proposals go beyond treating electronic-invoice access or letters to taxpayers as proof of collected revenue.3 4
Lasting service and productivity outcomes after RRF closure
Court reform, administrative simplification, competition and childcare also already appear in the continuing framework. The court commitments include further performance improvements and maintaining 6,000 court-support positions through 2029. Annual competition laws continue through 2029. Childcare commitments explicitly include operating finance and availability and affordability targets; the plan does not merely promise buildings.2
The remaining test is whether these measures keep producing results after the funding deadline. Training participation must translate into durable employment and skills. Faster court proceedings must remain faster. Childcare places must be staffed and usable. Public investment must become functioning infrastructure rather than only completed procurement or financing agreements.2 5
The IMF identifies easing regulatory barriers, better judicial efficiency, deeper capital markets and higher labour supply and skills as priorities. Their fiscal contribution is mainly indirect: more productive firms, greater employment and stronger taxable income. It cannot be assigned a precise 2029 revenue amount from a milestone count. Italy therefore needs continued implementation and outcome measurement, rather than another assertion that legal adoption has already delivered sufficient growth.4
Why even successful reforms cannot guarantee 136.6%
Italy’s 15 October 2026 policy scenario projects headline primary surpluses of 0.9% of GDP in 2027, 1.4% in 2028 and 2.4% in 2029. That is a 1.5-percentage-point improvement between 2027 and 2029. Its debt ratio falls from 138.5% to 136.6% over those years, a 1.9-point decline.1
A primary surplus is revenue minus expenditure before interest payments. It is not the same as a structural surplus, which adjusts for the economic cycle and temporary measures. Calling the 2.4% target a “structural surplus” would overstate what the cited figure means.1 6
Debt dynamics also depend on the interest–growth differential and stock–flow adjustments—debt movements that are not the same period’s deficit. MEF expects the cash effects of previously accrued housing-renovation tax credits to fade. Its projected stock–flow adjustments are 2.1% of GDP in 2026 and 1.3% in 2027, approaching zero towards the end of the horizon. The interest–growth effect remains unfavourable.1
Thus the target requires both stronger primary balances and favourable delivery of the other assumptions. Lower growth, higher refinancing costs, new unfunded commitments or unexpected debt adjustments could defeat the exact ratio even if the reforms were implemented. Conversely, favourable nominal GDP growth could improve the ratio without proving that the reforms raised productivity.
Spain’s growth-led decline is a different mechanism, not a different rulebook
AIReF’s 4 November 2026 constant-policy forecast attributes most of Spain’s projected debt reduction to nominal GDP growth. Over 2025–2031, growth contributes 24.6 percentage points of gross downward pressure, of which 13.4 points come from the GDP deflator. The primary balance contributes only 0.1 point of cumulative debt reduction. Interest and other factors offset most of the gross growth contribution.7
The GDP deflator measures the price component of domestically produced output; it is not a measure of productivity or the same index as consumer-price inflation. Real expansion and higher output prices both increase nominal GDP. Debt/GDP can therefore fall while the nominal debt stock continues to grow. That is a genuine improvement in the ratio, but it does not necessarily mean that more real resources have become available to service debt.
Spain’s government’s July 2026 debt objective is 95.3% in 2029. AIReF’s later constant-policy projection is 96.2%, or 0.9 percentage point higher. They use different assumptions and dates. Neither is an outturn. AIReF also expects pressure from pensions, defence and interest expenditure, with the deficit approaching 3% by 2031.7 8
Italy’s October policy path places much more emphasis on strengthening primary surpluses and the fading tax-credit cash effect. Spain’s independent path places much more emphasis on the denominator. This is not “Italy reforms, Spain grows”: both pursue reforms and both need growth. Nor can either path be credited to the RRF alone.
Both countries have conditional seven-year adjustment periods
The Council’s original January 2025 recommendations endorse seven-year adjustment over 2025–2031 for both countries. Spain’s plan covers 2025–2028 and Italy’s covers 2025–2029; those plan-coverage periods are not the same thing as adjustment length.2 9
Spain also has fiscal reform commitments. Its original endorsed package includes a permanent revenue increase of 0.4% of GDP under the tax-reform commitment by end-2028, a separate tax-benefits revenue commitment, and at least 0.1% of GDP in permanent annual spending-review savings by 2028. These are commitments, not verified realised yields. Growth does not replace them. Failure to satisfactorily deliver the reforms supporting an extension can lead to a shorter adjustment period and a revised spending path, subject to the regulation’s objective-circumstances exception.6 9
Net expenditure is the operational constraint
The new EU framework monitors country-specific net expenditure, not an exact headline primary surplus or a debt ratio viewed in isolation. This measure excludes interest and adjusts for discretionary revenue measures, specified EU-related spending, cyclical unemployment expenditure and one-offs.6
The original Council ceilings illustrate the different fiscal room: Spain’s maximum nominal net-expenditure growth for 2025–2028 is 3.7%, 3.5%, 3.2% and 3.0%; Italy’s corresponding ceilings are 1.3%, 1.6%, 1.9% and 1.7%, followed by 1.5% in 2029. These are differently calibrated paths under the same framework, not a general permission for Spain to spend every growth-related revenue gain.2 9
The debt-sustainability safeguard requires the designed trajectory to deliver an average annual debt-ratio decline of at least 1 percentage point when debt exceeds 90% of GDP. The averaging period depends on excessive-deficit-procedure timing. The original assessments use 2024–2031 for Spain and 2027–2031 for Italy. It is not a requirement that debt fall exactly one point in every calendar year. The deficit-resilience safeguard also requires structural adjustment towards a safety margin below the 3% deficit reference value.2 6 9
Unexpectedly strong nominal growth does not automatically raise the nominal spending ceiling. Expenditure deviations are recorded using outturn data; escape clauses and relevant economic circumstances are treated through the prescribed assessment. A declining debt ratio therefore cannot, by itself, prove compliance.6 10
This is a concrete concern for Spain, not just a theoretical caution. AIReF forecasts 7.3% net-expenditure growth in 2026 against the committed 3.5%, and warns that projected deviations exceed available margins even after the flexibilities it assumes. That is an independent forecast warning, not a completed Commission or Council determination of legal noncompliance.7
The practical contrast is therefore conditional. Italy needs lasting budget measures that sustain a larger primary surplus without weakening productive capacity. Spain needs to keep its spending path and reform commitments credible even when nominal growth makes debt/GDP look better. Neither milestone completion nor a favourable denominator provides a guarantee of fiscal sustainability.
References · original authorities
Source publication dates belong to each document. Government targets, independent forecasts, legal commitments and recommendations are not interchangeable.
- [1]Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance — Draft Budgetary Plan 2027, 15 October 2026, sections I.6–I.7 and table III.1-5
- [2]Council — Italy medium-term fiscal-structural plan recommendation, 21 January 2025, Annexes I–II and recitals 24–26
- [3]OECD — Economic Survey Italy 2026, 23 April 2026, public finances chapter and illustrative reform package
OECD source access · alternatives and a short summary
The original chapter returned an access challenge during the 18 November link audit. Access can differ in your browser. The original citation above is retained.
Try original source again — opens in a new tabOpen the same OECD survey as an official PDF — opens in a new tabSame 23 April 2026 survey, alternative format—not a newer edition. The publisher’s PDF link responded successfully in the access check; this is not a claim that every reader’s connection will succeed.
Local reading summary · Manus paraphrase
The survey recommends maintaining the pension-age link to life expectancy, avoiding new early-retirement schemes, improving VAT compliance and rationalising unjustified tax expenditures. It also recommends moving spending towards education and innovation. These are recommendations, not adopted savings that guarantee Italy’s 2029 debt target.
This short summary is not the full source document. Trying the link again opens a fresh source tab; it does not certify access or bypass the publisher’s controls. No automatic retries or live source-status checks run on this page. The local text and links work without JavaScript.
- [4]IMF — Italy Article IV Executive Board conclusion, 24 July 2026
- [5]Council — Italy revised RRF annex, August 2026, final payment schedules and specified reform conditions
- [6]European Parliament and Council — Regulation EU 2024/1263, Articles 2, 6–8, 14, 20 and 22
- [7]AIReF — Report on 2027 draft budgets and main budgetary lines, 4 November 2026, printed pages 12–14, 47, 83 and 88–90
- [8]Spanish Ministry of Finance — Government fiscal objectives for 2027–2029, 7 July 2026
Spanish government source access · alternatives and a short summary
The Finance Ministry connection failed during the 18 November link audit. This was not a confirmed missing document. The original citation above is retained.
Try original source again — opens in a new tabRead La Moncloa’s official Spanish report of the same announcement — opens in a new tabGovernment-hosted English version · non-official translation — opens in a new tabA distinct government report of the same 7 July 2026 announcement, not a copy of the original Finance Ministry release. The government-hosted English version is labelled a non-official translation.
Local reading summary · Manus paraphrase
The July announcement set gross general-government debt objectives of 97.6% of GDP in 2027, 96.4% in 2028 and 95.3% in 2029. These are the government’s announced objectives—not observed outcomes, a November forecast or proof of eventual parliamentary approval. AIReF’s separate November constant-policy forecast is 96.2% for 2029.
This short summary is not the full source document. Trying the link again opens a fresh source tab; it does not certify access or bypass the publisher’s controls. No automatic retries or live source-status checks run on this page. The local text and links work without JavaScript.
- [9]Council — Spain medium-term fiscal-structural plan recommendation, 21 January 2025, Annexes I–II and recitals 19–21
- [10]Council — Regulation EU 2024/1264, Article 1 point 2, expenditure deviations and relevant economic circumstances